- Would France go after each one, even if they were not operating servers physically in France? It only takes a few minutes to configure Unbound+LetsEncrypt to accept DoH+DoT internet traffic. A few minutes longer to compile support for DoQ.
- Could they realistically expect individual operators of small DoH/DoT/DoQ open servers to block domains at their behest?
As far as I know there is no way to reliably:
- let the user see this error. The client would need to surface the DNS EDE error. Stub resolvers and browsers overwhelmingly ignore EDE.
- geo-fence the client. Unbound does not have native Geo support and will not let one set custom per-zone EDE text even if that was a thing AFAIK.
This might be possible by putting dnsdist in front of Unbound with client IP rules + Lua + MaxMind but there again the client won't know what to do with this.
- custom views only trigger off client IP's and only control resolution views, not error messages.
I think it's probably best that if people wish to run their own DNS instances, they do not geo-block anything. France has no jurisdiction in other countries and can't really do anything to "Alice and Bob's Public DNS". It's up to the people in France to find a way to tunnel their traffic out of their country to bypass any border filters should that ever become a thing. I am still waiting for a lawyer to challenge my thinking on this part.
Public DNS like Quad9 should be a cache (because recursing is pretty slow) and, at most, a way to find the IPs of the root name servers.
Courts asking non-authoritative resolvers not to resolve a name should have no effect on clients successfully resolving that name, such that they wouldn’t even have a reason to go after Quad9 or Alice and Bob, and would have to go after the TLD registry (likely in a different jurisdiction).
Beyond that I think you are asking for behavioral and RFC changes to everyone's workstations, cell phones, tablets, TV's, and DNS resolvers.
It’s configured exactly like I mentioned: it tries a couple of resolvers, and if they all fail, tries authoritative servers starting from the root. That last part, missing from your suggested configuration, is the key: it’s what ensures courts have to actually go after the parties responsible for the domain, and not just random DNS resolvers.
> Beyond that I think you are asking for behavioral and RFC changes to everyone's workstations, cell phones, tablets, TV's, and DNS resolvers.
We did it once for DoH/DoT, we could do it again.