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MarleTangible | on: Let's Encrypt bans certificate usage in any US sanctioned territory [pdf]
I always saw it as a trust-chain and think that anyone is welcomed to create a root certificate and distribute it to whomever trusts them. Most simple services may not need TLS, but with the ISPs eavesdropping on our communication, a form of secure communication is required and the currently best solution we have requires a trust-chain to be built.
lesostep | parent | next
The problem is that finding a root source of trust aren't easy this days. LE was neutral, now nobody is.

Russian government issued their new root certificate years ago.

Nobody trusted it enough to request a certificate from them or install it on their computers. Including almost all of the russian residents.

If Let's Encrypt enforces the rules, as written in pdf, a lot of people would lose a choice.

Frankly, even publishing a statement like that would make the scales of trust tip for some.

happosai | parent | next
It is such a great improvement that ISPs cannot eavesdrop us anymore... only for everyone to terminate TLS at cloudflare so they (and thus US government) can now eavesdrop everyone.
owl57 | root | parent
If you have a service that shares information between people all over the world, a few big companies and one government is for most cases an improvement over all the involved ISPs and all of their respective governments.
Parodper | parent | next
We could, and should, switch to DANE. Or else, switch to how X.509 was supposed to be used, with each country running a CA for their nationals.
theamk | root | parent
I trust governments much less that a conglomerate of competing corporations.

With all the problems with Web PKI, at least the bad actors are getting distrusted, and this provides a very strong enforcement on the rest. And Certificate Transparency makes sure the mis-issuance would be caught. It is not perfect by any means, but things are getting better.

With DANE (or other country-issued certificates), every government will absolutely double-issue certificates to police, secret service and friends of goverment, and no one will have any recourse. (In the past I'd say that only countries like Russia would do it.. but with today's climate, I am sure both US and many European countries will do that too)

toast0 | root | parent | next
I'm not really in favor of DANE, because DNSSEC is such a mess ... but.

Certificate transparency is nice. Browsers could require it for DANE certificates, just like they require it for current Web PKI certificates.

The people controlling the TLD of interesting can exert control over the domain of interest in order to issue a DANE certificate. But they can also exert control over the domain of interest in order to request a domain control certificate, so widespread use of DANE wouldn't add any new adversaries. If DNSSEC wasn't a mess, and DANE replaced WebPKI, we would eliminate the risk from CAs without adding a new risk --- TLDs (and the DNS root) are existing risks.

trumpdong | root | parent
CT seems useless for DANE because the cert is self signed, so anyone can just flood the CT with self signed certs for your website. It's useful with WebPKI because only certs signed by a CA go in CT and it's a big deal if one is mis-issued. Anyone can mis-issue a self-signed cert at home for fun.
Parodper | root | parent | next
> every government will absolutely double-issue certificates to police, secret service and friends of goverment, and no one will have any recourse.

Countries already have CA that issue certificates with more legal force than a handwritten signature. I can open a bank account, pay my taxes and sign up to all government services. But I can't use them for a webpage.

> With DANE (or other country-issued certificates)

DANE isn't a country-issued certificate. It's a scheme where you store your public keys on DNS records. Of course, now we have the issue that DNSSEC (signed DNS records) isn't widespread and the whole issue with DNS registries.

theamk | root | parent
DANE is entirely dependent on DNSSEC, and DNSSEC is, by design, under the government control, with all the bureaucratic mess and mistakes this implies.

This would be pretty terrible if anyone actually cared about DNSSEC, but luckily for us, no one cares.. So let's keep things this way.

trumpdong | root | parent | next
Domain registries can already get a certificate for your domain by changing the address to their own server temporarily and then doing ACME with LE. So no new vector is introduced by directly putting the cert in DNS.
Parodper | root | parent
You obviously don't know how DNSSEC works. The DNS root of trust is ICANN, not a government.
trumpdong | root | parent
That's worse, because ICANN is effectively the US government.
gopher_space | root | parent | next
> I trust governments much less that a conglomerate of competing corporations.

There’s no essential difference between the two from my perspective. Why are these my only choices?

Parodper | root | parent | next
What other choices are there?

An international body might work, or just move the issue one step back.

r-w | root | parent
One, in a democracy, is accountable to adults in the same jurisdiction. The other is only accountable to those with financial ties to its success.
coldtea | root | parent
>One, in a democracy, is accountable to adults in the same jurisdiction

Or so they say. How's that been working out in practice?

trumpdong | root | parent | next
If each country could only sign its own domains it would make sense. If the US could only tamper with .us domains the system could be trusted in general. After all, that's no worse than what they already do by coming to your house and putting a gun to your head.
Parodper | root | parent
Pretty well, in my experience.
coldtea | root | parent
Yeah, that's why most countries in EU, as well as US, are in a huge dissarray, politicians have all time low approvals, people vote for something and get the opposite, and the economy and social climate turned to shit...

I guess one doing well enough can be oblivious to all this...

xorcist | root | parent | next
> I trust governments much less that a conglomerate of competing corporations

Let's not create a world wide PKI based on a political ideology.

> country-issued certificates [...] every government will absolutely double-issue certificates

This is such a strange argument. If you register a .ru domain, do you really think you are safe should the Russian intelligence services ask for a valid certificate? Controlling the actual domain, they could issue ask many domain validated certificates as they wish.

The problem with our current SSL PKI, as so very many people have pointed out over the years, is that any CA is allowed to issue valid certificates for any domain name. There have been proposals to use X.509 extensions to remedy this, but they have seen lesser real world usage than the various certificate revocation schemes, which is very close to zero already.

If there was no way for a Russian CA to issue certificates for .us domains, real world security would improve. A lot. And the other way around, of course.

Feel free to s/Russian/Chinese/ in the above argument or whatever tickles your geopolitical fancies. The argument still stands.

Domain registries decide who owns what domain. That is their literal role. You would think that asserting this ownership cryptographically would be a no-brainer in 2026. Yet we have this discussion over and over again. There are many people whose income quite literally depend on the status quo of our global SSL PKI, which coincidentally also offers no end of possibilities for the various intelligence services around the world.

The next time someone tries to scare you with that governments or intelligence services control DNS and therefore it would be crazy to limit issuance of certificates to them, take a look where they have contracts.

account42 | root | parent
Pretty much any big government has a CA they can exert direct control over whenever needed.
theamk | root | parent
Maybe, but then can only do it once. Then they get caught, and their CA is distrusted. See Diginotar [0] for example.

And things only gotten better since - we now have CT logs, and browsers require them, so any mis-issuance can be detected automatically, by any interested third party.

If we go to DANE, we lose this all. "Oops, our CT uploader process failed, we will fix Real Soon(tm) we promise" - and what are browsers going to do? Distrust the entire country?

[0] https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2011/09/02/diginotar-remov...

JumpCrisscross | root | parent | next
Side note: “DigiNotar BV was a Dutch certificate authority from 1998 to 2011. It was acquired in January 2011 by VASCO and subsequently declared bankrupt in September of the same year” [1].

I didn’t realize the slapped their face on the pavement right after being acquired.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DigiNotar

| root | parent | next
{"deleted":true,"id":48464086,"parent":48462811,"time":1781025232,"type":"comment"}
Fnoord | root | parent
The Dutch government didn't exercise control over Diginotar.

In the Dutch hacker scene, Diginotar was a meme. Everyone knew it was a mess there.

thaumasiotes | parent | next
> I always saw it as a trust-chain and think that anyone is welcomed to create a root certificate and distribute it to whomever trusts them.

Note that phones already try to prevent you from using a certificate that you provide yourself.

fluoridation | root | parent
"Try to prevent"? What does that mean?
trumpdong | root | parent
It means they prevent, unless you perform several undocumented arcane rituals.
account42 | parent
Do we also need to put all our letters into strongboxes before we send them?

Maybe we should have solve the ISP snooping problem by making that illegal instead.

lxgr | root | parent | next
> Do we also need to put all our letters into strongboxes before we send them?

If it were as cheap and efficient as TLS these days, yes, absolutely

> Maybe we should have solve the ISP snooping problem by making that illegal instead.

We could do both! ISP snooping is still a problem for metadata (SNI).

theamk | root | parent
This just leaves every single public Wifi network - which used to mess with traffic a lot
cyanydeez | root | parent
Guys, we live in a society.