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Most of the L4s have hypervisor situations. I don't know about TPM support. Generally the vibe I get from systems security people is a bit of eye-rolling about the formal verification of things like L4; the real win is just drastic attack surface reduction.

And then, of course, L4s live in millions and millions of shipped products, which is a reason to consider L4 instead of something novel, but I'm not saying you should or shouldn't.

I for one do not want any code in the TCB that is not formally verified, tiny, and easy to audit with every line of code justified.

SeL4 is the only open, mature, and formally verified L4 solution I am aware of that can run on modern servers, but IIRC given vCPUs are not first class objects and any low level CPU virtualization features are handled in user space, it comes at a real performance cost making it only suitable for single-core or non-performance-critical applications.

Nova by contrast was built to handle the expensive and trust critical TPM and vCPU handling directly for high performance remotely attestable multi-core applications without having to reach for something as heavy as Xen, though formal verification is admittedly not as complete as SeL4 yet AFAICT, though lots of recent progress here.

Those are pretty big tradeoffs, but if you or anyone else knows other viable xen alternatives this general shape with a tiny easily-auditable footprint, please chime in!

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