> GrapheneOS provides users with the ability to set a duress PIN/Password that will irreversibly wipe the device (along with any installed eSIMs) once entered anywhere where the device credentials are requested (on the lockscreen, along with any such prompt in the OS).
From your feature overview. Wiping the device means zeroing everything where userdata may exist, not wiping the keystore. I'm sure wiping the keys is technically okay but how many more inconsistencies like that do you have?
That's not an inconsistency but rather the only way to reliably wipe user data. It would be completely broken to attempt wiping data by zeroing the userdata partition. That wouldn't get rid of all the data from the SSD even with secure erase commands for overwriting it.
A modern SSD has both static and dynamic wear leveling. An SSD redirects writes to the free blocks with the least wear and also moves around used blocks to free up the least heavily written parts of the storage. An SSD with a proper whole drive secure erase implements it by securely wiping keys.
You made an inaccurate attack on GrapheneOS and included a personal attack on the founder of the project with no basis too.
I understand all of this. But wiping means what it does, and "removing the keys of an encrypted partition" is not the same. Please be more forthcoming in the documentation.
Sure Daniel
This is just pedantic and dishonest. 'Wiping data' as a concept very much so includes cryptographically scrambling it and losing the key.
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