If they key is distributed by DNS, then you need to secure DNS, e.g. with DNSSEC. Well, with DNSSEC the TLDs and root basically have the same status as CAs (although it does cut down the huge number of CAs that can issue certs).
Of course we wouldn't want ICANN to do that on a whim, or without having a new operator for the TLD ready to go, but there's already process defined for both planned and emergency transfers of operation of a TLD:
https://www.icann.org/en/contracted-parties/registry-operato...
Which is exactly the kind of scenario a lot of people hyperventilated about back when ICANN was formed, for reasons of varying validity, but in this case it would indeed be the least-worst option all around.
You can disagree! But then: let's just keep the premises clear. You think DNSSEC makes sense because you also think states will lose control over their registry operators.
I would expect ICANN to use that power very sparingly, preferring to publicize rather than act as a first step, and if they did get heavy-handed, again they would incur a hit to their legitimacy.
The only reason it's considered unthinkable that could happen to .com is that everybody agrees it's unthinkable to do that to .com. But ICANN absolutely could make a credible threat to US control of .com or .us if they felt it warranted to do so. (You could say they're ICANN, not ICANN'T.) They could do the same to .gov, for that matter, but the US government already explicitly owns and controls that whole hierarchy, so there's no real "interference" issue there.
The whole Internet's viability is based to some extent on the collective delusion that everybody agreeing this is how it works, actually makes it how it works. But none of that is set in stone... which is generally a good thing.