The other proposed change (to restrict access to certain interfaces or IP addresses) seems good, but why not allow developers to restrict access localhost?
It reeks of trying to block Shizuku, Canta, etc. using a way that only makes it look like a side-effect.
Not just that. A non-development Android build will also prompt the user when a connection is made to authorize the client's key.
This once again isn't about security of users, this is about security of the company's interests.
[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-top-court-dismisses-google-...
The introduction of Manifest V3 API in Chrome for extensions, and disabling Manifest V2 for security reasons. It just so happened that ad blockers were made incompatible with the Manifest V3 API. It's a little blatant considering this came right around the time that YouTube began showing warning messages to users with ad blockers...
Requiring developers to verify their apps via Google Play Developer Console and blocking any unverified APK installations. This is done in such a way that it just so happens to squash F-Droid and most FOSS apps for most people, and blocks any serious competition to Google Play or any apps they don't like.
Of course, there's all this talk about preventing malware, but it is a fact that if you download any random ringtone or PDF app on Google Play it's going to come with probably 25 trackers and send your data to every jurisdiction in the world, and many apps even fail to declare any of this via Google Play data safety or privacy policy. Let's not forget that spyware is a form of malware. Take a look at the leaderboard :) https://reports.exodus-privacy.eu.org/en/reports/list/?filte...
In my opinion, this would probably be an indication that maybe Google controls too much technology and that they may need to be broken up to ensure fair competition. For Christ's sake they almost broke up Microsoft not that long ago for shipping a browser with their operating system, and now Google is blatantly controlling the operating system, the platform and app store, the ecosystem, the browser, the ad network, and abusing their power over it however they can.
1. Enable Developer Mode by going to an obscure settings page and tapping the build number seven times
2. Enable USB ADB debugging in the Developer Options
3. Establish an actual USB ADB session
4. Enable TCP/IP ADB debugging in the Developer Options
5. Unknowingly download a malware app from the official Play Store
6. Blindly click "Yes" on the permission prompt.
In other words: this is all but impossible to impact regular users, and it requires a particularly careless developer to be hit by it. And it only works if the Play Store is useless at preventing malware in the first place - but I thought their excellent app scanning was the entire reasoning behind all-but-banning 3rd-party app stores and sideloading???
It is "for safety" in the same sense that governments banning all encryption is to "protect the children" or to "prevent terrorism": flawed justification invented to distract from the real reason they want it.
I'm not saying it's right to respond by simply locking everything down, but let's not downplay the blast radius of basically every attack that involves telling the user to do things.
Have you ever worked with someone who barely knows how to use a mobile phone? They will hand their phone over to someone they barely even know to do something they don't understand. They will follow instructions from a stranger over the phone, without understanding what the phone is warning them about.
I have worked with such a person. They did have someone walk them through a dubious process. Thankfully they realized what was going on before the process was complete, but who knows how much damage was done by the initial steps.
There are legitimate security reasons here. Whether there are reasons beyond that is an open question.
But even then, shouldn't this show the same permission prompt for the user that anything else trying to connect to port 5555 would?
Not the least because most of our industry relies on it to make money. Marketing and advertising themselves are institutionalized forms of "do this thing that's actually harmful to you to get free coins / be safe / get laid".
I mean, this seems more like one of the root causes for a lot of bad things in the industry me...
- the app embedding the proxyware SDK for money
- the proxy operators
- the attackers/botnets using the proxy to access ADB.
The botnet has no access to the app, so it can't show any messages.
The app can show messages, but probably has no connection to the botnet. (I hope)
The proxy operators could show a message by abusing the SDK even more, but that would mean they actively colluded with the botnet. Is that likely? Then they could just give the botnet direct access to the app, no need to do the whole proxy thing.
That said, I wasn't under the impression kimwolf was that technically sophisticated. Some of the others are, though.
This is a CVE by any definition and you'd be screaming your head off if any other OS would allow this kind of permission bypass (or even if another app did it).
But sure, Google evil.
I think a possibility of knowingly pushing the handlebar should be removed from me, just in case. After all I could do it.
And while we're at it I just realised my car has a similar vulnerability, but triggered by a slightly different mechanism, but the effect is exactly the same, I can crash into a pillar.
Edit: oops, I just discovered that if I have a banking app installed on my phone, then tap my screen in the specific places, enter several numbers, including the number I receive in text, suddenly I lose all the money.
That's staggering!
The CVE mentioned in the article is https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0073. That's a real CVE: logic error leading to auth bypass. Fix can be seen at https://android.googlesource.com/platform/packages/modules/a....
Separately, a number of people here are attempting to argue that the availability of On-Device ADB should be regarded as a "CVE" in and of itself. Google does not appear to share that view.
This was proposed by a Google employee: https://issuetracker.google.com/issues/526109803#comment3
Or perhaps they wouldn't? CVEs aren't holy scripture, and "security" isn't the most important consideration in computing. This theatre has gone too far IMO.
There are 3 things which I feel like are being confused here:
1. There was a genuine authentication bypass vulnerability in ADB (bad)
2. Initial proposed change wants to add an option to limit the ADB server to certain IPs or network interfaces (good - it doesn't affect you)
3. Response to the original request, proposing that ADB shouldn't be allowed to listen on loopback interfaces (bad/nefarious - it breaks functionality)
[1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0073
[2] https://issuetracker.google.com/issues/526109803#comment1
[3] https://issuetracker.google.com/issues/526109803#comment3
I love how quickly you all forget about security and privacy when it gives a chance to angrily rant.
Letting applications bypass permissions with this feature is the exact usecase they don't want to lose. If anything, I don't see them being against the original proposal possibly restricting non-loopback access, which would enhance security.
Right now any app on my PC connected to ADB could manipulate my phone then, and that's somehow not a CVE?
If you are talking about allowing listening on localhost - remote ADB requires enabling in the developer settings. It is a developer feature, similar to ADB over USB. If I'm charitable, it is possible that they are seeing too many people that are using Shizuku without understanding the security implications. But Shizuku has a lot of useful applications and they use ADB because the Android APIs and permission system are lacking and do not make these applications possible.
It's like saying that the fact the user knows their own password is a vulnerability because they might enter it to log into their account.
seriously, get real, please explain how your train of thought works here