In the book, I give dozens of examples of companies that were well-lead and then suddenly destroyed, often by outside actors who found a way to profit from their destruction. This often happened at the governance layer, while leadership watched helplessly from the sidelines.
So why hasn't this happened to Costco? I don't think it's a coincidence that Costco has a variety of "bad governance" provisions, such as a super-majority (of all shares, not just votes) provision threshold for shareholder votes, as just one example. When activists, analysts and other Wall Street actors have tried over the years to force Costco to change, its leadership has been insulated from this pressure. I think that is a structural factor that is important.
Again, structure does not _cause_ ethos. It protects it. My argument in the book is you need both.
Do you believe there's a fundamental tradeoff between structural constraints (i.e. the 'democratic' model, where dispersed shareholders and markets have a voice) vs. insulated leadership (i.e. the 'benevolent dictator' model, where competent leaders are shielded from short-term shareholder pressure)?
Also, thank you for your quick replies.
Somewhat related: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benevolent_dictatorship