Sometime ago I wrote a library for a customer that did exactly that: Open a number of resources, e.g., stdin, stdout, stderr, a pipe or two, a socket or two, make the seccomp calls necessary to restrict the use of read/write/etc. to the associated file descriptors, then lock out all other system calls - which includes seccomp-related calls.
Basically, the library took a very Capsicum-like approach of whitelisting specific actions then sealing itself against further changes.
This is a LOT of work, of course, and the available APIs don't make it particularly easy or elegant, but it is definitely doable. I chose this approach because the docker whitelist approach was far too open ended and "uncurated", if you will, for the use-case we were targeting.
In this particular case, I was aided by the fact the library was written to support the very specific use-case of filters running in containers using FIFOs for IPC, logging, and reporting: Every filter saw exactly the same interfaces to the world, so it was relatively easier to lock things down.
Having said that, I wish Linux had a Capsicum-equivalent call, or, even better for the approach I took, a friendlier way to whitelist specific calls.
I'm not sure what glibc's latest policy is on linking statically, but at least it used to be basically unsupported and bugs about it were ignored. But even if supported, you can't know if it under some configurations or runtime circumstances uses dlopen for something.
Or maybe once you juggle more than X file descriptors some code switches from using `poll()` to using `select()` (or `epoll()`).
My thoughts last time I looked at seccomp: https://blog.habets.se/2022/03/seccomp-unsafe-at-any-speed.h...