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As soon as you start going down the rabbit hole of state sponsored supply chain alteration, you might as well just stop the conversation. There's literally NOTHING you can do to stop that specific attack vector.

History has shown, at least to date, Apple has been a good steward. They're as good a vendor to trust as anyone. Given a huge portion of their brand has been built on "we don't spy on you" - the second they do they lose all credibility, so they have a financial incentive to keep protecting your data.

Apple have name/address/credit-card/IMEI/IMSI tuples stored for every single Apple device. iMessage and FaceTime leak numbers, so they know who you talk to. They have real-time location data. They get constant pings when you do anything on your device. Their applications bypass firewalls and VPNs. If you don't opt out, they have full unencrypted device backups, chat logs, photos and files. They made a big fuss about protecting you from Facebook and Google, then built their own targeted ad network. Opting out of all tracking doesn't really do that. And even if you trust them despite all of this, they've repeatedly failed to protect users even from external threats. The endless parade of iMessage zero-click exploits was ridiculous and preventable, CKV only shipped this year and isn't even on by default, and so on.

Apple have never been punished by the market for any of these things. The idea that they will "lose credibility" if they livestream your AI interactions to the NSA is ridiculous.

> They made a big fuss about protecting you from Facebook and Google, then built their own targeted ad network.

What kind of targeting advertising am i getting from apple as a user of their products? Genuinely curious. I’ll wait.

The rest of your comment may be factually accurate but it isn’t relevant for “normal” users, only those hyper aware of their privacy. Don’t get me wrong, i appreciate knowing this detail but you need to also realize that there are degrees to privacy.

> What kind of targeting advertising am i getting from apple as a user of their products?

https://searchads.apple.com/

https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/control-how-apple-del...

  In the App Store and Apple News, your search and download history may be used to serve you relevant search ads. In Apple News and Stocks, ads are served based partly on what you read or follow. This includes publishers you’ve enabled notifications for and the type of publishing subscription you have.
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> If you don't opt out, they have full unencrypted device backups, chat logs, photos and files.

Also full disk encryption is opt-in for macOS. But the answer isn't that Apple wants you to be insecure, they just probably want to make it easier for their users to recover data if they forget a login password or backup password they set years ago.

> real-time location data

Locations are end to end encrypted.

> Also full disk encryption is opt-in for macOS. But the answer isn't that Apple wants you to be insecure, they just probably want to make it easier for their users to recover data if they forget a login password or backup password they set years ago.

"If you have a Mac with Apple silicon or an Apple T2 Security Chip, your data is encrypted automatically."

The non-removable storage is I believe encrypted using a key specific to the Secure Enclave which cleared on factory reset. APFS does allow for other levels of protection though (such as protecting a significant portion of the system with a key derived from initial password/passcode, which is only enabled while the screen is unlocked).

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It's disingenuous to compare Apple's advertising to Facebook and Google.

Apple does first party advertising for two relatively minuscule apps.

Facebook and Google power the majority of the world's online advertising, have multiple data sharing agreements, widely deployed tracking pixels, allow for browser fingerprinting and are deeply integrated into almost all ecommerce platforms and sites.

They have not been punished because they have not abused their access to that data.
Didn’t Edward reveal Apple provides direct access to the NSA for mass surveillance?

> allows officials to collect material including search history, the content of emails, file transfers and live chats

> The program facilitates extensive, in-depth surveillance on live communications and stored information. The law allows for the targeting of any customers of participating firms who live outside the US, or those Americans whose communications include people outside the US.

> It was followed by Yahoo in 2008; Google, Facebook and PalTalk in 2009; YouTube in 2010; Skype and AOL in 2011; and finally Apple, which joined the program in 2012. The program is continuing to expand, with other providers due to come online.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants...

That seemed to be puffery about a database used to store subpoena requests. You have "direct access" to a service if it has a webpage you can submit subpoenas to.
Didn’t Apple famously refuse the FBI’s request to unlock the San Bernardino’s attacker’s iPhone. FBI ended up hiring an Australian company which used a Mozilla bug that allows unlimited password guesses without the phone wiping.

If the NSA had that info, why go through the trouble?

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> There's literally NOTHING you can do to stop that specific attack vector.

E2E. Might not be applicable for remote execution of AI payloads, but it is applicable for most everything else, from messaging to storage.

Even if the client hardware and/or software is also an actor in your threat model, that can be eliminated or at least mitigated with at least one verifiably trusted piece of equipment. Open hardware is an alternative, and some states build their entire hardware stack to eliminate such threats. If you have at least one trusted equipment mitigations are possible (e.g. external network filter).

E2E does not protect metadata, at least not without significant overheads and system redesigns. And metadata is as important as data in messaging and storage.
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Strictly speaking there's homomorphic encryption. It's still horribly slow and expensive but it literally lets you run compute on untrusted hardware in a way that's mathematically provable.
Yeah the impetus for PCC was that homomorphic encryption wasn't feasible and this was the best realistic alternative.
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As to the trust loss, we seem to be already past that. It seems to me they are now in the stage of faking it.
...in certain places: https://support.apple.com/en-us/111754

Just make absolutely sure you trust your government when using an iDevice.

When it comes to China, it's not entirely fair to single out Apple here given that non-Chinese companies are not allowed to run their own compute in China directly.

It always has to be operated by a sponsor in the state who hold encryption keys and do actual deployments etc etc.

The same applies to Azure/AWS/Google Cloud's China regions and any other compute services you might think of.

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>Just make absolutely sure you trust your government

This sentence stings right now. :-(

> History has shown, at least to date, Apple has been a good steward.

cough* HW backdoor in iPhone cough*

cough bullshit cough

Don't try to be subtle. If you are going to lie, go for a big lie.