https://blog.archive.org/2020/03/30/internet-archive-respond...
This seemed already at the time completely counter-productive and unnecessary step as it basically forced the publishers to react because it made IA's digital lending indistinguishable from casual e-book piracy.
They have now created a legal precedent that, in addition to finding the "National Emergency Library" illegal, makes the controlled lending they implemented previously illegal. Ever since the district court ruling they have been able to continue digital lending only by negotiating compensation terms with the publishers.
So, instead of expanding everyone's access to the digital archives, they have managed to indefinitely limit it by creating a restricting legal precedent. This was the inevitable outcome of "National Emergency Library" and they knew or should have known it.
casual e-book piracy doesn't include DRM.
They knew. I have an MLIS and took one copyright course and could tell immediately that what they were doing was illegal/wouldn't hold up in court. For them not to know would suggest that their staff is less informed than I am, which can't be true.
It may make logical sense to think of CDL as indistinguishable from physical book lending in libraries, but because it entailed making a copy, that was never legally the case.
You can defend against the default presumption by arguing fair use. The IA did try this but it was very clearly doomed to fail, because they are providing whole copies for normal use. It was so obvious it was a summary judgement. “Fair use” is not a general term about what we think should be allowed, it has a specific statutory definition and there is no serious debate over whether CDL can be twisted into it. It may be morally right but it’s clearly legally wrong.
It may be ridiculous that yes, if you scan in a book, send it to your friend, burn your physical copy and delete your copy of the scan, that you inarguably committed copyright infringement. But that’s the law.
The ruling clearly addresses this in the section about the application of fair use to the idea of the CDL (that is, where the lending is controlled in the way we’re idealizing) and it was deemed obviously illegal. The very act of making and distributing a copy is what is infringement, and as the ruling clearly lays out none of the pillars of fair use come close to applying as a defense. Crucially, it is not transformative (it’s the same book used in the same way) and the entire work is copied.
The law is bad and it sucks and we need to change it. It’s depressing to me that so many really smart people don’t have a good understanding of this, probably because most infringement usually goes unpunished. We don’t get to deem it okay simply because it logically makes sense that controlled digital lending is obviously equivalent to physical lending. Unfortunately the act of making the copy and then distributing it changes everything.
> "This appeal presents the following question: is it “fair use” for a nonprofit organization to scan copyright-protected print books in their entirety and distribute those digital copies online, in full, for free, subject to a one-to-one owned-to-loaned ratio between its print copies and the digital copies it makes available at any given time, all without authorization from the copyright-holding publishers or authors? Applying the relevant provisions of the Copyright Act as well as binding Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent, we conclude the answer is no."
Let's not flip the situation upside down though: IA didn't limit anything, the publishers did. The publishers have the possibility to make this possible if they want, and they don't want to: the responsibility is entirely on them.
Anyone going all in on either side is not on the side of maximizing access, which legitimately depends on maximizing the production of things to access.
Anyone making a crusade of only one side, without collaborating with the other, will damage both.
The Internet Archive didn’t even get dragged into court for an interesting case, and their defiance was ideologically interesting but jurisprudentially uninteresting.